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INTRODUCTION
The idea of creating a direct connection
between a human brain and a computer
has a long history in science fiction. The
development of brain computer inter-
faces (BCI), technologies permitting direct
communication between a user’s brain and
an external device, began to become a
reality in the 1970s (Vidal, 1973), and
have since captured the attention of sci-
entists and the public alike. Initially con-
ceptualized for military use—the initial
work was funded by the National Science
Foundation and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—
more recently BCIs have shown promise
for therapeutic uses, providing hope for
restorative and even enhanced human
capacities.
Utilizing both invasive and non-
invasive technologies, scientists are now
capable of recording and translating
activity from populations of neurons to
operate external devices (e.g., O’Doherty
et al., 2011). In early 2013, the technol-
ogy took a leap forward as researchers
replaced the external computer con-
nection with a second embodied brain,
dubbing the approach “brain-to-brain”
interfacing (BTBI). The direct trans-
fer of information between two brains
raises new and important ethical issues.
Below, we summarize the first two
landmark studies in BTBI research,
and then discuss ethical concerns rel-
evant to BTBI as they are applied in
clinical, research, and non-therapeutic
domains.
KEY FINDINGS IN BTBI
SENSORIMOTOR TRANSMISSION BETWEEN
TWO RATS
Two studies mark the first major advances
in BTBI technology. In the laboratory
of Miguel Nicolelis, Pais-Vieira et al.
(2013) successfully transferred sensori-
motor information from the brain of
one rat into that of another. Rats were
trained to complete a discrimination task
in which illumination of an LED above
one of two levers indicated which lever
was rewarded. Rats were then grouped
into either the “encoder” or “decoder”
cohort and implanted with either record-
ing or stimulating electrodes, respectively,
in their primary motor cortices. The
goal was to transfer task relevant motor
information from encoder to decoder
rats via electrical stimulation to inves-
tigate whether this transfer could allow
the decoder to correctly perform the dis-
crimination task in the absence of any
other cues. With each correct decoder
response, the encoder received an addi-
tional reward resulting in a feedback loop
for encoders. Without BTBI, decoder per-
formance was at chance; when BTBI was
used, however, decoder performance was
significantly enhanced, enabling animals
to choose the correct lever when receiv-
ing neural information from encoders.
The investigators found similar perfor-
mance enhancements with the transfer
of somatosensory information (i.e., dis-
criminating aperture width). Pais-Vieira
et al. (2013) also coupled the brains of
a rat in North Carolina with a rat in
Brazil, sending information via Internet,
rather than to the adjacent cage. Here, too,
decoder rats chose the correct lever more
often when BTBI was implemented. A sub-
sequent study by Deadwyler et al. (2013)
demonstrated that cognitive information
related to the encoding of a memory could
also be transferred from one rat’s brain to
another’s.
CROSS SPECIES NEURAL INTERFACING
A second group, based in Harvard Medical
School, utilized a non-invasive form of
BTBI to transfer information from human
to rat brains, marking the first inter-
species brain interfacing study. Yoo et al.
(2013) recorded signals from a human
scalp and transformed these signals into
tail-movement-evoking stimulation deliv-
ered to the brain of an anesthetized
rat. Electroencephalography (EEG) was
used to record neural activity from
humans who were presented with a visual
stimulus. When the human participant
intentionally focused attention on the
stimulus, a steady-state visual evoked
potential (SSVEP), a robust electrophys-
iological signal corresponding to active
visual focus, was produced. The SSVEP
triggered a stimulation pulse delivered
to an anesthetized rodent’s scalp using
focused ultra-sound (FUS), in which
focused acoustic energy is delivered non-
invasively to a targeted brain region
(but see Davis and van Koningsbruggen,
2013 re: “non-invasive”). Delivery of the
SSVEP-invoked FUS pulse reliably evoked
rodent tail movement. Yoo et al. (2013)
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suggest that interspecies BTBI may even-
tually be used in the reverse direction,
from non-human animals to humans,
for such things as enhancing our sensory
systems (e.g., improving olfaction by link-
ing our olfactory systems to those of a
dog) or aiding in search-and-rescue oper-
ations, linking our brains with those of the
search-and-rescue animal.
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
The very act of linking two brains together
to transfer information raises a variety of
ethical and safety concerns. Though born
of two approaches, extraction and delivery
of information, that are each privy to their
own suite of ethical issues, BTBIs are a
novel means of information transfer which
bypasses the customary sensory means
for the brain to apprehend information
from another individual. Table 1 summa-
rizes ethical issues associated with each
aspect of BTBI technology. Such a novel
approach demands careful consideration,
especially as we develop human-to-animal
and human-to-human BTBI technologies.
Table 1 | Ethical concern by component of brain-to-brain interfacing.
Extraction of information Delivery of information Combination
Privacy
E.g., safely storing and
protecting the wealth of data
extracted via neural recording
techniques (Alpert, 2007)
Potential for adverse
sequelae
Invasive and non-invasive
stimulation techniques lack a
proper body of research into
potential negative long term
effects (Bell et al., 2009;
Horvath et al., 2014)
Responsibility for damages
incurred while operating
BTBI
Some precedence with BCI
(Tamburrini, 2009), but linking
two brains adds several
complications
Informed consent
E.g., modifying
hardware/software
parameters to optimize
recording in a non-responsive
patient (Vlek et al., 2012)
Informed consent
E.g., keeping patient informed
about reasonable expectations
and potential risks associated
with brain stimulation (Rabins
et al., 2009)
Ownership of BTBI
generated ideas
If ideas are generated during
the use of BTBI, who rightfully
owns those ideas?
Enhancement
E.g., stimulation being used to
enhance learning and memory
(Bass et al., 2012)
Agency
Issues regarding the
inability/ability to control
one-self/another being while
operating BTBI devices
Coercion
Possibility of eventual
non-consensual use to control
or coerce thought or behavior
Personhood
How does one define oneself
as a person when brains are
wired between individuals?
BTBI can be broken down into two components: extracting neural information and delivering neural infor-
mation. Each of these components is associated with several of its own ethical concerns. However, when
combined and manifested as BTBI, several novel ethical considerations emerge.
Here we will discuss three categories of
concern: potential violations of privacy,
human enhancement, and agency and
identity.
NEURAL PRIVACY
Similar to any technology that can extract
meaningful information from an indi-
vidual’s brain/body (e.g., fMRI, genetics,
EEG), BTBI raises concerns of privacy.
While considerable effort has been made
to protect genetic information, few safe-
guards have been created for neural data.
Priorities in mapping the human connec-
tome, as with the new US Brain Initiative
and the EU’s Human Brain Project, fore-
ground the potential for brain-based data
to be as powerful and identifiable as
genetic data. In addition, fMRI technolo-
gies are already being used to recon-
struct videos observed by participants
(Nishimoto et al., 2011), decode the cat-
egory of objects viewed by participants
(Haxby et al., 2001), and decipher whether
or not subjects are lying (Davatzikos
et al., 2005). BTBIs add another dimension
to the neural privacy concern; not only is
information extracted and decoded from
the transmitting brain, it is introduced to
a receiving brain, presumably without the
ability of that brain to refuse or inhibit
the impulse. The specter of introducing
various kinds of information coercively is
also a plausible ethical concern. Because
BTBI-related neural information can be
transferred over the Internet (as in Pais-
Vieira et al., 2013, above), conceivably,
one could “hack” another’s neural device
as has been done with heart pacemakers
(Halperin et al., 2008). In addition, these
transmissions could be communicated
discretely, with items such as “epidermal
electronics” (Kim et al., 2011)—extremely
thin grids of electrical sensors applied
directly to the outside of the skin, similar
to a temporary tattoo—placed on the fore-
head under hair, for instance. BTBI con-
nections, especially through wireless trans-
missions, could eventually allow soldiers
or police—or criminals—to communicate
silently and covertly during operations.
Another concern, though still far in the
future, is the eventual possibility to use this
technology coercively. If thoughts can be
planted, or behavior compelled, through
interfaces that send stimulation or infor-
mation directly to the brain, it is theo-
retically possible at some point that such
technology might be used without con-
sent to control the behaviors of prisoners,
for example. While the current state of
the technology is too primitive for such
use now, vigilance is imperative as this
research continues.
ENHANCEMENT
As is the case with other neural interven-
tions, such as transcranial direct current
stimulation (TDCS) (Coffman et al., 2013)
and pharmacological substances (Greely
et al., 2008), BTBI has the potential to
be used to enhance human cognition
(Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009) or well
being (Earp et al., 2014). For example,
coupling brains could one day provide an
advantage to students, enhancing speed of
knowledge or skill acquisition. BTBI facil-
itated learning could widen the gap of
social inequities in education and other
areas even further, as it is likely that very
few will be able to afford initial prototypes.
Though progress in brain interfacing
technology must first overcome several
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technological obstacles (Lebedev and
Nicolelis, 2006), the future promises
advances that will encourage individu-
als to experiment with these technologies
for enhancement purposes, perhaps even
creating home-made brain interfacing
devices as has already been done with
TDCS (Fitz and Reiner, 2013) despite
substantial concern regarding the readi-
ness of TCDS technology (Horvath et al.,
2014). Do-it-yourself kits for creating
TDCS-like devices are already pre-selling
from some websites (www.foc.us) and
instructional videos for home-made
TDCS devices can be found on YouTube.
Using EEG, Presacco et al. (2012) recently
demonstrated success decoding detailed
information about limb movements
recorded as participants walked on a tread-
mill. Likewise, Choi (2013) decoded with
high accuracy the shoulder and arm joint
movements of participants based on non-
invasive recordings. If this information
could be transferred via stimulation to
the relevant regions of a second individ-
ual’s (or non-human animal’s) brain, it
may be possible to control the limbs of
the receiving subject via encoder’s neu-
ral activity. For example, a recent article
(Sakurada et al., 2013) reports experi-
ments in which EEG was used to control a
Brain-Machine Interface (BMI) suit worn
by the user, allowing the suit to grasp a ball
and subsequently drop the ball in a target
location.
Some have argued that such use of
BCIs outside the context of therapeutics
violate individual authenticity, disrespects
the “limits of nature,” and puts us as
risk of losing “what makes us human”
(Kass, 2003; Demetriades et al., 2010).
More nuanced concerns include issues like
the loss of autonomy and the potential
for coercive control over another creature.
Clearly the implications of these technolo-
gies for changing the nature of human
functioning and capacity deserve careful
thought and scrutiny as the technologies
develop.
AGENCY AND IDENTITY
If one is defined by his or her neurophys-
iology, a neuro-essentialist view (Roskies,
2002; Racine et al., 2005), then how is indi-
viduality defined when a brain is synched
with another’s, or perhaps many others’?
Might one’s concept of the self yield to
a new, communal sense of identity? Who
owns thoughts generated in brain-to-brain
interfacing? Related to questions of iden-
tity are concerns over the issue of agency
and responsibility. Tamburrini (2009), for
example, points out that by using BCI
technology, users accept some degree of
responsibility for actions of the machine
with which s/he is integrated. Therefore,
s/he may be at fault for damage (such
as a BCI wheelchair damaging someone’s
property). In the case of BTBI, on the other
hand, where it may not be clear that a
“decoder” is acting on her own accord, the
assessment of responsibility becomesmore
complex.
The US and UK defense departments
are significant funders of BMI research
for cognitive and performance enhance-
ment (Hoag, 2003; The Royal Society
Science and Policy Centre, 2012). With its
liberal approach to “enhancement” (e.g.,
Caldwell and Caldwell, 2005) and history
of researching BMIs for wounded sol-
diers (Kotchetkov et al., 2010), the mili-
tary may be the first to employ BTBI in
humans. Yet BTBI in combat may make
issues of responsibility even more confus-
ing. Imagine that a soldier in ground com-
bat with a helmet mounted camera is able
to neurally receive information directly
from a second soldier monitoring the
video in real-time. If the monitoring indi-
vidual detects a threat on the video, this
information could rapidly be transferred
to the ground soldier who could respond
with greater speed and potentially, greater
accuracy. While benefits, such as improved
reaction time, can readily be identified in
such an example, questions arise when
one considers potential accidents, such as
injury by friendly fire or collateral damage.
Who would be responsible for the soldier
or civilian deaths—ground or monitoring
soldier? What if the stimulation pattern
was misinterpreted by the ground soldier
or computer’s algorithm, or intentionally
transmitted by the monitoring individual?
While current BTBI research is focused
on transferring information, future work
might include transfers emotion or even
false memories, as was done recently in
mice (Ramirez et al., 2013).
Pilots operating drone planes miles
from combat zones sometimes report
experiencing PTSD (Otto and Webber,
2013). Some speculate that such symptoms
are similar to “vicarious traumatization,”
found in mental-health workers who have
listened to first-hand accounts of war-
time violence (Reardon, 2013). Arguably
the mental impact of technologies that
remove the actor one-step from the
action may warrant a new approach
by psychiatry (Wolpe, 2007). Thus, per-
sonal ethical dilemmas and potential
mental health challenges that may arise
from using such interfaces require further
consideration.
CONCLUSION
Recent advances in brain interfacing tech-
nologies now allow for direct commu-
nication between two individuals’ brains
(Pais-Vieira et al., 2013; Yoo et al., 2013).
To date there is no legislation regulat-
ing informed consent and protecting per-
sonal data extracted via BCIs, much less
BTBIs, either therapeutically or outside of
the clinical and research context. Further,
no formal protocols are in place for how
to conduct research using these technolo-
gies, with humans or non-human ani-
mals. These studies continue to advance;
recent unpublished preliminary data by
researchers at University of Washington
mark the first human to human BTBI, uti-
lizing non-invasive EEGs and transcranial
magnetic stimulation. Further the non-
invasive nature of these technologies, the
ease of engineering the relevant hardware,
and the enthusiastic DIY culture interested
in cognitive enhancement make explor-
ing these ethical issues especially pressing.
Ethical discourse around BTBI must keep
pace with the advances in technology in
order to prepare for possible life-changing
implications of BTBI use. We have seen
the public uproar and subsequent oppo-
sition to technology, as with mammalian
cloning with Dolly, when there is a failure
to prepare the public for such innova-
tion (Wolpe, 2006). In order to best pre-
pare the public to understand the implica-
tions of BTBI, ethicists and scientists must
work together to ensure that the technol-
ogy is developed with the highest ethical
standards.
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